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TAKING “BLIND SHOTS AT A HIDDEN 
TARGET”: WITNESS ANONYMITY IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Jason M. Swergold*
Abstract: Witness intimidation has become an increasing problem in the 
United Kingdom, and as a result, British courts have allowed witnesses to 
testify anonymously in cases where they are fearful of testifying. Recently, 
the House of Lords overturned a murder conviction based on anonymous 
witness testimony on the grounds that it rendered that trial unfair. Par-
liament responded by codifying the power to grant witness anonymity as it 
existed before the Law Lords’ decision. The use of anonymous witnesses 
raises questions about the right of a defendant to confront the witnesses 
before him or her, a right that has its history in English common law and 
is guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. This 
Comment argues that the use of anonymous witness testimony violates a 
defendant’s right to confrontation, and proposes possible alternatives. 
Introduction 
 On June 18, 2008, the House of Lords ruled that a series of protec-
tive measures used to conceal the identity of prosecution witnesses 
“hampered the conduct of the defence in a manner and to an extent 
which was unlawful and rendered the trial unfair.”1 The decision had 
instant effects in the United Kingdom, jeopardizing dozens of criminal 
proceedings and bringing to a halt a murder trial at London’s Central 
Criminal Court which had already cost the government £6 million.2 
Parliament responded almost immediately by creating a statutory 
framework for witness anonymity;3 it passed The Criminal Evidence 
                                                                                                                      
* Jason M. Swergold is a Staff Member for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
1 R v. Davis, [2008] UKHL 36, (2008) 1 A.C. 1128, 1130 (H.L.) (U.K.). Lord Bingham, 
in his opinion, notes that anonymous witness testimony forces the defendant to “take blind 
shots at a hidden target.” Id. at 1149. 
2 A Matter of Justice, Economist, June 28, 2008, at 63. The decision applies to criminal 
cases in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Law “to Change” on Witness Rules, BBC 
News, June 21, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7467058.stm (last visited Apr. 
1, 2009). 
3 David Howarth, The Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008, 8 Arch. News 6, 7 
(2008). 
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(Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 (Witness Anonymity Act) on July 21, 
2008, a mere month and three days after the decision from the Lords 
of Appeal.4 The temporal relationship between the decision and the 
Act speaks to an inherent contradiction in British courts: that “the 
principle of open justice is England’s most enduring contribution to 
the law of other nations,”5 yet British judges have precluded defendants 
from knowing the identity of a testifying adverse witness.6
 Part I of this Comment provides a background on Davis and the 
protective measures used during the trial. This section also discusses 
the House of Lords’ ruling and the reaction in the United Kingdom, 
including a brief outline of the Witness Anonymity Act. Part II focuses 
on whether the right to confrontation truly exists in British courts and 
the competing public policy concerns that have driven courts in the 
United Kingdom to allow anonymous witness testimony. Part III ana-
lyzes in more detail the Witness Anonymity Act and its attempt to pro-
vide judges with the power to order the same protective measures the 
House of Lords held were unfair in Davis. This section focuses on 
whether the Witness Anonymity Act has struck the proper balance be-
tween witness protection and defendants’ rights. In doing so, it looks at 
the Witness Anonymity Act from the perspective of U.S. jurisprudence 
on the issue of confrontation. Lastly, this Comment discusses whether 
the Witness Anonymity Act can be amended to properly protect both 
the rights of defendants and the witnesses who testify against them. 
I. Background 
A. The Case of Iain Davis: Trial and First Appeal 
 Iain Davis was convicted of two counts of murder in the Central 
Criminal Court on May 25, 2004.7 The New Year’s Day murders,8 and 
the subsequent trial, received substantial media coverage.9 Despite 
                                                                                                                      
 
4 Id. at 6. The Lords of Appeal (also referred to as Law Lords) is the United Kingdom’s 
equivalent to the United States Supreme Court. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to 
the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 26 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 187, 193 (2007). 
5 Stefano Maffei, The European Right to Confrontation in Criminal Proceed-
ings: Absent, Anonymous and Vulnerable Witnesses 144 (2006). 
6 Id. at 197. 
7 R v. Davis, [2008] UKHL 36, (2008) 1 A.C. 1128, 1136 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
8 R v. Davis, [2006] EWCA Crim. 1155, (2006) 2 Cr. App. R. 32, 471 (U.K.). 
9 See, e.g., Jason Bennetto, One Bullet Kills Two Men at New Year Party, Independent 
(London), Jan. 3, 2002, at 8; Nick Hopkins, Woman, 19, Shot in Head in Mobile Phone Theft, 
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Davis’ claim that he had left before the shooting,10 three witnesses, who 
were friends of one of the victims, identified Davis as the shooter.11 
These witnesses claimed that they feared for their lives if it became 
known that they had identified the defendant.12 The trial judge and 
Court of Appeal, after an investigation, accepted the claims and or-
dered that the following special measures be taken: the witnesses each 
give evidence under a pseudonym; their addresses, personal details, 
and any identifying information be withheld from the defendant and 
his counsel; defendant’s counsel be prohibited from asking the wit-
nesses any questions which might lead to their identification; the wit-
nesses give evidence from behind screens so that only the judge and 
jury can see them; and the defendant only be able to hear a mechanical 
distortion of their voices.13
 Prior to trial, the defense was provided with information on each 
witness, disclosing any previous convictions as well as “any links the po-
lice were able to discover between each of them and any other prosecu-
tion witness.”14 In addition, the prosecution and the police investiga-
tion team informed the court that they had no information indicating 
that the victim’s family was orchestrating the testimony of the witnesses, 
nor that the witnesses had any motive to falsely implicate Davis.15
 On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Davis’ counsel argued that the 
trial was unfair, and that the measures ordered by the trial court were 
contrary to English common law and Article 6(3)(d) of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR).16 In an opinion dismissing the appeal, Sir Igor 
                                                                                                                      
Guardian (London), Jan. 3, 2002, at 8; Single Bullet Kills Two Partygoers, BBC News, Jan. 2, 
2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/England/1737828 (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). 
10 Davis, 1 A.C. at 1136. 
11 Davis, 2 Cr. App. R. at 471. 
12 Davis, 1 A.C. at 1137. 
13 Id. 
14 Davis, 2 Cr. App. R. at 474. The court went on to state: 
In reality there was vast disclosure of relevant material including, for example, 
a list of all the party goers who were known to the police, the previous convic-
tions of each prosecution witness, and the identity of all the information 
available to the police of each and every individual said to be “implicated” in 
this shooting. 
Id. 
15 Id. at 473. 
16 Davis, 1 A.C. at 1137. 
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Judge, the Head of Criminal Justice and President of the Queen’s 
Bench Division at the time,17 stated that: 
Without for one moment suggesting that counsel was not 
faced with unwanted difficulties, and accepting that there 
were one or two matters which might have been investigated 
more closely, our conclusion is that the anonymity ruling did 
not prevent proper investigation with the witnesses, and be-
fore the jury, of the essential elements of the defence case.18
B. The House of Lords Judgment and the Fallout 
 The House of Lords sent lawmakers into a frenzied panic with its 
decision in Davis.19 Basing their judgment on the right to confrontation 
in English common law, recent United Kingdom authorities on protec-
tive measures, and the ECHR, the Law Lords clearly determined that 
the protective measures used in Davis deprived the defendant of a fair 
trial.20 There was less clarity, however, about the future use of protective 
measures in British courts.21 Lord Mance indicated that “further re-
laxation of the basic common-law rule” of confrontation was for Par-
liament to determine,22 and he was joined in this view by Lord Rodger 
of Earlsferry, though Lord Rodger did not pass judgment on whether 
such Parliamentary action was in fact needed.23
 There has been much confusion regarding the long-term implica-
tions of the Law Lords’ decision,24 due in part to the absence of a de-
                                                                                                                      
 
17 Her Majesty’s Court Service, http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/1287.htm 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2009). 
18 Davis, 2 Cr. App. R. at 479. 
19 See A Matter of Justice, supra note 2, at 63. 
20 See Davis, 1 A.C. at 1137–49. 
21 See id. Lord Bingham of Cornhill did not expressly comment on the validity of pro-
tective measures, only stating that, “a trial so conducted cannot be regarded as meeting 
ordinary standards of fairness.” Id. at 1149. Lord Brown of Eaton-Under-Heywood issued 
perhaps the most declaratory statement, noting that, “the creeping emasculation of the 
common law principle must be not only halted but reversed.” Id. at 1160. 
22 Id. at 1173–74. 
23 Id. at 1153 (“But Parliament is the proper body both to decide whether such a change 
is now required, and, if so, to devise an appropriate system which still ensures a fair trial.”) 
(emphasis added). 
24 Compare Jack Straw, Lord Chancellor and Sec’y of State for Justice, Statement on the 
Anonymity of Witnesses ( June 26, 2008), http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/announcement 
260608a.htm [hereinafter Jack Straw Statement] (“[T]he Law Lords decided that there 
was not sufficient authority in common law to provide for the current arrangements for 
the admission of anonymous evidence . . . .”) (last visited Apr. 1, 2009), with Howarth, su-
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finitive ruling on the future of protective measures.25 What is clear is 
the immediate effect the judgment has had in the British courts and 
the government.26 On June 24, six days after the judgment in Davis, a 
£6 million trial of two men accused of killing London businessman 
Charles Butler, in which four witnesses had testified anonymously, was 
halted halfway through the trial.27 The judge, in discharging the jury, 
stated, “[l]ast Wednesday, the House of Lords decided in a very far-
reaching judgment that evidence from anonymous witnesses cannot be 
admitted.”28 The judgment in Davis led the Crown Prosecution Service 
to suspend all cases where anonymous witnesses were used, and caused 
many in the legal and criminal justice communities to believe that 
some of Britain’s most dangerous convicted criminals would seek ap-
pellate review of their trials.29
 In response, lawmakers, led by Secretary of State for Justice Jack 
Straw, pushed through emergency legislation to “make sure that, where 
necessary, anonymous evidence can continue to be given so that we can 
bring the most violent and dangerous criminals to justice.”30 The Wit-
ness Anonymity Act was not heavily debated in Parliament, largely due 
to the recognition that witness intimidation posed a real threat and a 
measured response was necessary.31
 The Act, in section 1, provides “for the making of witness anonym-
ity orders in relation to witnesses in criminal proceedings”32 and abol-
ishes the common law power of a court to make an order for withhold-
                                                                                                                      
pra note 3, at 6 (“All these judges seem to be saying that a common law power exists but 
that limits exist on its proper exercise.”). 
25 See Davis, 1 A.C. at 1137–49; Howarth, supra note 3, at 6. 
26 See Richard Edwards, Jack Straw to Unveil Emergency Law to Stop Collapse of Trials, Daily 
Telegraph (London), June 25, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ 
2194206/Jack-Straw-to-unveil-emergency-law-to-stop-collapse-of-trial.html [hereinafter Edwards, 
Emergency Law]; Richard Edwards, £6m Trial for Murder of Charles Butler Collapses After Lords 
Anonymity Ruling, Daily Telegraph (London), June 24, 2008, available at http://www.tele- 
graph.co.uk/news/uknews/2188070/and1636m-trial-for-murder-of-Charles-Butler-collapses-after- 
Lords-anonymity-ruling.html [hereinafter Edwards, Charles Butler Murder]. 
27 Edwards, Charles Butler Murder, supra note 26. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. It was estimated that up to 600 applications for witness anonymity had been, or 
were being made in pending trials, and that up to 40 cases were being prepared for ap-
peal. Edwards, Emergency Law, supra note 26. 
30 Press Release, Ministry of Justice, Witness Anonymity - Emergency Legislation Receives 
Royal Assent Today ( July 21, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/newsre- 
lease210708a.htm. 
31 See Howarth, supra note 3, at 7. 
32 Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act, 2008, c.15, § 1(1) [hereinafter Witness 
Anonymity Act]. 
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ing the identity of a witness from the defendant in a criminal proceed-
ing.33 As described in the Act, a witness anonymity order allows the court 
to use any or all of five enumerated protective measures.34 The Act goes 
on to list three conditions that must be satisfied, taking into account the 
interests of the witness, the defendant, and justice as a whole.35 In addi-
tion, the Act provides that it shall apply to proceedings which are cur-
rently in progress at the time the Act is passed.36 Finally, the Act includes 
a provision to block any appeal brought on the grounds that the court 
had granted a witness anonymity order.37
II. Discussion 
A. The Right to Confront Witnesses in British Courts 
1. Confrontation in the Common Law 
 The foundation of the right to confrontation can be traced back to 
Roman law.38 On the continent of Europe, with its rich history of civil law 
and private examination of witnesses,39 there rarely existed such a con-
cept prior to the twentieth century.40 In England, the common law tradi-
                                                                                                                      
33 Id. § 1(2). The Act extends to England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Id. § 15(2). 
34 See id. § 2(2)(a)–(e). Despite the ease with which one can draw the inference that 
the Witness Anonymity Act was specifically intended to overturn Davis, this notion disap-
peared from Parliament’s pen. Compare Explanatory Notes to the Criminal Evidence (Wit-
ness Anonymity) Bill as Introduced in the House of Commons, July 3, 2008, para. 50 (“It 
aims to restore the law to, broadly, the position it was believed to be prior to Davis.”), with 
Explanatory Notes to the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Bill, July 8, 2008, para. 
54 (“This Bill puts on a statutory footing a power for the courts to grant witness anonymity 
orders in criminal proceedings where this is consistent with the right of a defendant to a 
fair trial.”). 
35 See Witness Anonymity Act, § 4(2)–(5). 
36 See id. § 9(1)(b). 
37 See id. § 11(2)(a); Explanatory Notes to the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) 
Act, July 21, 2008, para. 50. 
38 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988); see Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confronta-
tion: It’s History and Modern Dress, 8 J. Pub. L. 381, 384 (1959). Both Justice Scalia, in his 
majority opinion in Coy, and Pollitt point to the New Testament for evidence of confronta-
tion in Roman law: the Roman Governor Festus stated, “I told them that it was not the 
custom of the Romans to hand over anyone before the accused had met the accusers face 
to face and had been given an opportunity to make a defense against the charge.” Acts 
25:16 (NRSV); see Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015. Some argue that the idea of confrontation extends 
as far back as the writings of the Hebrews. See Maffei, supra note 5, at 13; Natalie Kijurna, 
Note, Lilly v. Virginia: The Confrontation Clause and Hearsay— “Oh What a Tangled Web We 
Weave . . . ,” 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1133, 1138 (2001). 
39 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004). 
40 See Maffei, supra note 5, at 16. 
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tion favored open proceedings and a “face-to-face” “altercation” between 
the witness and the accused.41 Such a concept could be found in early 
forms of English dispute resolution predating what we now refer to as 
trial by jury.42 As the concept of a trial evolved in England, so too did the 
role of witnesses, who were now seen as an integral part of judicial pro-
ceedings, and whose presence could be compelled by the court.43
 By the late sixteenth century, the right to confrontation was be-
coming a customary part of English trials.44 Still, criminal proceedings 
in England were not immune from continental civil code influence.45 
Defendants accused of treason were not given the right to confront 
their accusers, despite statutes to the contrary.46 The most notorious 
case was that of Sir Walter Raleigh, whose request to “call my accuser 
before my face” was not well-received by the court.47 By the mid-
seventeenth century, however, the right to confrontation was enjoyed in 
nearly all criminal cases, regardless of the charges, as the common law 
began to predominate.48 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen noted that “[i]n 
every case, so far as I am aware, the accused person had the witnesses 
against him produced face to face, unless there was some special reason 
(such as sickness) to justify the reading of their depositions.”49
                                                                                                                      
41 See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 Geo. L.J. 
1011, 1022–23 (1998). The description of this process as an “altercation,” as Friedman 
notes, comes from Thomas Smith’s De Republica Anglorum. Id. at 1023. 
42 See Pollitt, supra note 38, at 385–86 (analogizing certain components of trial by or-
der, oath, and battle with the current conceptions of confrontation). In the early forms of 
the trial by jury, the jurors were themselves witnesses. Id. at 386. It was not until the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries that juries became the triers of facts presented through 
evidence. See 9 W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 127 (1926). Today, juries 
are no longer used in civil cases in the United Kingdom (except for defamation cases). 
Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of Justice 
Claims, 45 Va. J. Int’l L. 809, 880 (2005). 
43 See Holdsworth, supra note 42, at 178. 
44 See Pollitt, supra note 38, at 387–89. 
45 See Maffei, supra note 5, at 14 (“At that time, the continental inquisitorial style was 
also making its way to England and Wales. Some equity courts and the Star Chamber ad-
hered to the secret procedures of the Inquisition.”). 
46 See Pollitt, supra note 38, at 388. It is noteworthy that Article III, section 3 of the 
United States Constitution states that “No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on 
the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.” 
U.S. Const. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
47 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. Interestingly, the right to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses at trial was codified by Parliament over fifty years before Sir Raleigh’s trial. See Maf-
fei, supra note 5, at 13–14. 
48 See Holdsworth, supra note 42, at 230. 
49 1 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 358 
(1883). 
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 The notion that, by the eighteenth century, a right to confrontation 
was an established element of English common law has wide support 
among English commentators.50 In fact, the right was established at the 
this time in many American colonies.51 The presence of a right to con-
frontation in the common law, coupled with the absence of a clear au-
thority establishing such a right, reflected recognition in England that a 
certain level of morality should be included in the search for justice.52
2. Confrontation in the ECHR 
 A right to confrontation also exists under Article 6 of the ECHR.53 
Article 6 broadly secures a right to a fair trial54 and enumerates five 
minimum rights, including a person’s right “to examine or have exam-
ined witnesses against him . . . .”55 The right to confrontation is gener-
ally satisfied under the ECHR so long as the accused has the opportu-
nity to cross-examine an adverse witness.56 In Kostovski v. Netherlands, 
the European Court of Human Rights (European Court) held that the 
right to confrontation does not necessarily require the opportunity to 
examine a witness at trial, so long as the opportunity was available at 
some other point in the proceedings.57 Nevertheless, the right to con-
frontation under the ECHR must be understood in light of Article 6’s 
main objective.58 Thus, while the European Court has found violations 
of Article 6(3)(d) in cases involving anonymous witness testimony,59 it 
has declined to find a violation where it has concluded that the trial was 
essentially fair.60
                                                                                                                      
50 See R v. Davis, [2008] UKHL 36, (2008) 1 A.C. 1128, 1138 (H.L.) (U.K.) (citing a 
number of prominent authorities who had recognized the practice). 
51 See Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 213 n. 7 (Cal. 2000). The Virginia Bill of 
Rights, adopted in 1776, was the earliest colonial declaration of the right to confrontation. 
See Francis H. Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States: A study in Constitutional Development 23 (1951). 
52 See Stephen, supra note 49, at 358–59. 
53 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(3)(d), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 228 [hereinafter European Con-
vention]. 
54 See Stephanos Stavros, The Guarantees for Accused Persons Under Article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights 42 (1993). 
55 See European Convention, supra note 53, art. 6(3)(d). 
56 Human Rights and Criminal Justice 639–40 (Ben Emmerson et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2007). 
57 App. No. 11454/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 434, 448 (1990). 
58 See Can v. Austria, App. No. 9300/81, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 421, 422 (1985). 
59 See, e.g., Windisch v. Austria, App. No. 12489/86, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 281, 287–88 (1991). 
60 See, e.g., SN v. Sweden, App. No. 34209/96, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 13, 316–17 (2004); 
Asch v. Austria, App. No. 12398/86, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 597, 607 (1993). 
2009] Witness Anonymity in the United Kingdom 479 
 In 1998, Parliament passed the Human Rights Act (H.R.A.) “to 
give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights . . . .”61 Under the H.R.A, British 
courts are bound by the ECHR and thus a defendant may assert a right 
to confrontation under Article 6(3)(d).62 Prior to the incorporation of 
the ECHR into domestic law, aggrieved defendants could petition the 
European Commission of Human Rights directly under Article 25 of 
the ECHR.63 With the passing of the H.R.A., Parliament intended for 
British courts to consider the rights of the ECHR in their decision mak-
ing process.64 Clause 6 of the H.R.A. makes it “unlawful for a public 
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention 
right”65 and later lists as a public authority “a court or tribunal.”66 In 
addition, courts must take into account judgments of the European 
Court when “determining a question which has arisen in connection 
with a Convention right.”67 Finally, under the H.R.A., a person can rely 
on Convention rights in legal proceedings if that person claims that a 
public authority has acted contrary to clause 6,68 thus providing them 
with a forum to air their grievances in the United Kingdom.69
B. Witness Anonymity 
 Although the United Kingdom holds a prominent place in the his-
tory of the right to confrontation, it is understood that the right is not 
                                                                                                                      
61 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, References & Annotations; see Sec’y of State for 
the Home Dep’t, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, 1997, Cm. 3782, ch. 
2.1 [hereinafter Rights Brought Home] (“The essential feature of the Human Rights 
Bill is that the United Kingdom will not be bound to give effect to the Convention rights 
merely as a matter of international law, but will also give them further effect directly in our 
domestic law.”). 
62 See Maffei, supra note 5, at 99, 143. But cf. R(D) v. Camberwell Green Youth Ct., 
(2005) 1 W.L.R. 393, 397 (H.L.) (U.K.) (“It is, however, sufficiently accurate to make one 
anticipate that the introduction of article 6(3)(d) will not have added anything of signifi-
cance to any requirements of English law for witnesses to give their evidence in the pres-
ence of the accused.”). 
63 See Human Rights and the European Convention 8–9 (Brice Dickson, ed., 
1997); Conor Mulcahy, Note, Unfair Consequences: How the Reforms to the Rule Against Hearsay 
in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Violate a Defendant’s Right to a Fair Trial Under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 28 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 405, 410 (2005). 
64 Andrew Ashworth, The Impact on Criminal Justice, in The Impact of the Human 
Rights Bill on English Law 146 (Basil S. Markesinis, ed., 1998). 
65 Human Rights Act, § 6(1). 
66 Id. § 6(3)(a). 
67 Id. § 2(1)(a). 
68 See id. § 7(1)(b). 
69 See Rights Brought Home, supra note 61, ch. 2.3. 
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absolute.70 In response to the violence in Northern Ireland in the 
1970s, Parliament passed legislation limiting an accused’s right to con-
front witnesses,71 though it refrained from codifying measures to pre-
vent disclosure of a witness’s identity.72 Since then, witness intimidation 
has become a major problem in the United Kingdom,73 and the estab-
lishment of special measures to deal with this problem has been a joint 
project of the courts74 and Parliament.75 Any question as to the power 
of the courts to shield a witness’s identity seemed to be answered in 
2006, when Sir Igor Judge stated that “the discretion to permit evidence 
to be given by the witnesses whose identity may not be known to the 
defendant is now beyond question.”76
 Prior to the enactment of the Witness Anonymity Act, a judge’s 
discretion to allow a witness to testify anonymously was governed by R v. 
Taylor,77 and later clarified by the Court of Appeal in Davis.78 Under 
Taylor, a judge would consider a number of factors: the grounds for the 
witness’s fear, the importance of the evidence to the prosecution and 
whether it would be unfair to exclude it, the creditworthiness of the 
witness, and whether there would be any undue prejudice to the ac-
cused.79 Upon a request for witness anonymity, a judge balanced the 
necessity of protecting a witness’s identity with “potential or actual dis-
advantages faced by the defendant in consequence of any anonymity 
ruling.”80 There was, however, no bright-line test for the judge to apply, 
                                                                                                                      
70 See William E. O’Brian, The Right of Confrontation: U.S. and European Perspectives, 121 
L.Q.R. 481, 494 (2005). 
71 See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, § 5 (allowing the ad-
mission of written statements made and signed in the presence of a constable when the 
maker of the statement was unavailable for reasons such as death). 
72 See Sec. of State for Northern Ireland, Report of the Commission to Con-
sider Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activities in Northern Ireland, 
1973, Cmnd. 5185, para. 20 (suggesting to Parliament that measures such as screening and 
withholding the name and address of the witness would “gravely handicap” the accused’s 
counsel). 
73 See Jack Straw Statement, supra note 24. 
74 See id. 
75 See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 116; Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act, 1999, c. 23, §§ 17, 23–29. 
76 R v. Davis, [2006] EWCA 1155, (2006) 2 Cr. App. R. 32, 466 (U.K.). 
77 See Human Rights and Criminal Justice, supra note 56, at 567. 
78 See Davis, 2 Cr. App. R. at 466–67. 
79 Human Rights and Criminal Justice, supra note 56, at 567. 
80 See Davis, 2 Cr. App. R at 466. 
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and while certain factors were to be considered, ultimately, the decision 
came down to the specifics of the case.81
 In addition, British courts have drawn some guidance from deci-
sions of the European Court, which noted in Doorson v. Netherlands that 
although Article 6 did not require the consideration of the interests of 
witnesses, “[c]ontracting States should organize their criminal proceed-
ings in such a way that those interests are not unjustifiably imperiled.”82 
There is, however, a major difference between the European Court and 
British courts when considering the importance of the anonymous wit-
ness evidence to the case.83 The European Court has held that there 
cannot be a reliance on anonymous witness testimony when it is “deci-
sive” to the outcome of the case.84 British judges, on the other hand, 
consider the importance of the anonymous witness testimony to the 
prosecution.85 With the passing of the Witness Anonymity Act, the di-
vergent practices of the European Court and British courts now seem 
to work in tandem.86 Under section 4 of the Act, a witness anonymity 
order may not be granted unless, inter alia, “it is necessary to make the 
order in the interests of justice by reason of the fact that it appears to 
the court that it is important that the witness should testify . . . .”87 But, 
in making such a determination, the court must consider whether the 
evidence will be the “sole or decisive” evidence that implicates the de-
fendant.88
                                                                                                                      
81 See id. at 467. As one example, the court noted that “[i]f satisfied that this witness is 
indeed independent, but unfit to give live evidence, the judge may admit his or her evi-
dence, anonymously, and in statement form.” Id. Nevertheless, “if the decisive evidence 
comes from an unidentified witness who cannot be cross-examined . . . the judge may de-
cide that the evidence should not be admitted.” Id. 
82 See App. No. 20524/92, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330, 331 (1996). 
83 See Human Rights and Criminal Justice, supra note 56, at 567. 
84 See id.; see also Eur. Consult. Ass., Concerning Intimidation of Witnesses and the Rights of 
the Defence, Recommendation No. R(97) 13, para. 13 (1997) (“When anonymity has been 
granted, the conviction shall not be based solely or to a decisive extent on the evidence of 
such persons.”). 
85 See Human Rights and Criminal Justice, supra note 56, at 567 (“The evidence 
must be sufficiently important to make it unfair for the Crown to proceed without it.”). 
86 See Witness Anonymity Act, 2008, c.15, §§ 4(5)(a) & 5(2)(c). 
87 Id. § 4(5)(a). 
88 Id. § 5(2)(c). 
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III. Analysis 
 The European Court has held that the use of anonymous witness 
testimony is not always incompatible with Article 6(3)(d).89 In its report 
on the Witness Anonymity Bill, and consistent with the European 
Court’s jurisprudence, Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights 
concluded that “the Bill contains adequate protections for the right to 
a fair trial and does not therefore risk incompatibility with Article . . . 
6(3)(d) ECHR.”90
 Contrary to the European Court and Parliament’s opinion on the 
matter, the granting of a witness anonymity order under the Witness 
Anonymity Act is in conflict with the right of confrontation and denies 
a defendant the fundamental right to a fair trial.91 The relevant consid-
erations to be regarded by the judge under section 5 do little to im-
prove upon the common law guidelines that existed prior to Davis and 
the Witness Anonymity Act.92 In addition, the use of anonymous wit-
nesses creates secondary effects which increase the prejudice to the de-
fendant.93 Thus, while British judges have generally resisted the ap-
proach to confrontation used in U.S. courts,94 the interests of justice 
would be better served by adopting Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
and the importance placed on effective cross-examination as a guide to 
credibility and the truth.95
                                                                                                                      
89 See Van Mechelen v. Netherlands, App. Nos. 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93, & 
22056/93, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 647, 673 (1998) (citing Doorson v. Netherlands, App. No. 
20524/92, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330, 358 (1996)). 
90 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Criminal Evidence 
(Witness Anonymity) Bill, 2007–8, H.L. 153 & H.C. 950, at 13. 
91 Cf. R v. Davis, [2008] UKHL 36, (2008) 1 A.C. 1128, 1150 (H.L.) (U.K.) (finding the 
protective measures used rendered the trial unfair). A comparison of the protective measures 
used in Davis with the measures enumerated in the Witness Anonymity Act reveals that they 
are in fact, the same. Compare id. at 1137, with Witness Anonymity Act, § 2(2)(a)–(e). 
92 Compare Human Rights and Criminal Justice, supra note 56, at 567 (listing the 
factors relevant to the judge’s discretion under Taylor), with Witness Anonymity Act, 
§ 5(2)(a)–(e). 
93 See, e.g., Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986) (possible inferences drawn by the 
jury from measures taken to isolate the defendant); Robert E. Goldman, The Modern Art 
of Cross-Examination 3 (1993) (inability of defense counsel on cross-examination to adapt 
his questioning based on the witness’s demeanor). 
94 See R(D) v. Camberwell Green Youth Ct., [2005] UKHL 4, (2005) 1 W.L.R. 393, 399 
(H.L.) (U.K.) (“It is for the people of the United States, and not for your Lordships, to 
debate the virtues of the Sixth Amendment in today’s world.”). 
95 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990) (“The combined effect of . . . ele-
ments of confrontation—physical presence . . . cross-examination, and observation of de-
meanor by the trier of fact—serves the purposes of the Confrontation Clause by ensuring 
that evidence . . . is reliable and subject to . . . rigorous adversarial testing . . . .”). 
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A. Witness Credibility Becomes a Non-issue 
 When an accusing witness testifies anonymously, the right to con-
frontation is violated and the accused loses the opportunity to effectively 
cross-examine the witness.96 A witness anonymity order creates two prob-
lems: first, the credibility of the witness is predetermined before that 
witness goes before the jury,97 and second, once the witness takes the 
stand, the defense is limited in discrediting the witness’s testimony.98
 Absent knowledge of the witness’s identity, the defense is severely 
limited in challenging the credibility of the witness,99 and thus cannot 
properly cross-examine them.100 Because an anonymity order handi-
caps the defendant,101 the Witness Anonymity Act provides that a judge 
must consider the credibility of a witness before issuing the order.102 In 
support of an application for an order, it is the duty of the prosecutor 
to provide the court with all relevant material “including material that 
may tend to cast doubt on the credibility, reliability or accuracy of the 
witness’s evidence.”103 If there is an issue of a witness’s credibility, how-
ever, it has historically been and should continue to be the role of the 
jury to resolve such issues. 104 It can hardly be said that the credibility of 
a witness is better determined by a review of “relevant material” than by 
                                                                                                                      
96 See 2 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence: Specially Applied to 
English Practice 413–14 (1827) (“The operation has two professed objectives . . . the 
other is, that an opportunity may be afforded to the defendant, in addition to whatever 
testimony may have been delivered to his disadvantage, to obtain the extraction of such 
other part . . . of the facts within the knowledge of the deponent, as may operate in his 
favour.”). 
97 See generally Witness Anonymity Act, § 5 (requiring the judge to determine the wit-
ness’s credibility before issuing a witness anonymity order). 
98 See Kostovski v. Netherlands, App. No. 11454/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 434, 448 (1990) 
(“If the defence is unaware of the identity of the person it seeks to question, it may be 
deprived of the very particulars enabling it to demonstrate that he or she is prejudiced, 
hostile or unreliable.”). 
99 See id.; see also Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968) (“Yet when the credibility of 
a witness is in issue, the very starting point in ‘exposing falsehood and bringing out the 
truth’ through cross-examination must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and 
where he lives.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
100 See Smith, 390 U.S. at 131 (“To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the thresh-
old is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.”). 
101 See The Attorney Gen.’s Office, Attorney General’s Guidelines: The Prose-
cutor’s Role in Application for Witness Anonymity Orders B1 (2008), http://www. 
attorneygeneral.gov.uk/default.htm (click on “Publications” link; then scroll down and 
locate the hyperlink in the “Freedom of Information - Disclosure Log 2008”) (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Attorney General Guidelines]. 
102 See Witness Anonymity Act, § 5(2)(b) & (d). 
103 Attorney General Guidelines, supra note 101, at B3. 
104 See George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as a Lie Detector, 107 Yale L.J. 575, 577 (1997). 
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a face-to-face confrontation with the defendant, and his attorney, in the 
courtroom.105 Indeed, cross-examination is a “critical tool” that allows a 
defendant to undermine the credibility of a witness.106
 Under the Witness Anonymity Act, the judge essentially “vouches” 
for the witness and deems credibility a non-issue.107 A normally credible 
witness, however, can be mistaken, and their testimony can suffer from 
a number of infirmities.108 The manner in which a cross-examiner 
chooses to conduct himself when questioning the witness can affect the 
witness’s demeanor on the stand109 and the jury’s perception of that 
witness’s testimony.110 When an anonymous witness testifies from be-
hind a screen, the defense cannot observe the witness’s demeanor and 
tailor its questioning accordingly.111 More troubling is the notion that 
the demeanor of an anonymous witness, shielded from the defense, 
may not be indicative of his truthfulness.112 While the Witness Anonym-
ity Act conditions witness anonymity orders on a defendant’s receiving 
of a fair trial,113 it compromises a defendant’s ability to challenge the 
credibility of an anonymous witness and thus impermissibly provides a 
structure in which the truth may be buried.114
B. The Inference of Guilt 
 Section 7 of the Witness Anonymity Act gives the judge very broad 
discretion to give an appropriate warning to the jury “to ensure that the 
fact that the order was made in relation to the witness does not preju-
dice the defendant.”115 Such a warning is inadequate to prevent the 
                                                                                                                      
105 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (discussing how confrontation allows 
the jury to draw its own conclusion about the truth of the witness’s testimony). 
106 See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 744 (1987). 
107 Cf. U.S. v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18 (1985) (impropriety of a prosecutor vouching for 
the credibility of a witness). 
108 See Susan Rutberg, Conversational Cross-Examination, 29 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 353, 
362–63 (2005); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 957, 958 
(1974) (listing the testimonial infirmities). 
109 See Francis L. Wellman, The Art of Cross-Examination 10–11 (4th ed. 1936). 
The witness’s demeanor “traditionally has been believed to furnish trier and opponent 
with valuable clues.” Fed. R. Evid. Art. VIII advisory committee’s note. 
110 See Goldman, supra note 93, at 2. 
111 See id. at 3. 
112 See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019. 
113 Witness Anonymity Act, § 4(4). 
114 See Howarth, supra note 3, at 7 (“[B]ut there are more practical reasons for distrust-
ing the evidence of witnesses whose credibility cannot easily be challenged. Anonymised 
witnesses make it possible for old scores to be settled . . . .”). 
115 Witness Anonymity Act, § 7(2). 
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jury from drawing the inference that, if a witness needs to be “pro-
tected,” the defendant must be dangerous and a criminal.116
 The U.S. standard for determining whether courtroom procedures 
are prejudicial offers an alternative. The courts will look at whether “an 
unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into 
play.”117 In Coy v. Iowa, for example, a sexual abuse case involving the 
screening of child witnesses, the defendant contended that the use of 
screens would make him appear guilty.118 Although the majority did 
not deal with this issue (finding it unnecessary to do so because the 
screens violated the confrontation clause), the dissent was satisfied with 
the judge’s instruction and noted that “[a] screen is not the sort of 
trapping that generally is associated with those who have been con-
victed.”119 While a judge’s instruction may have been enough to over-
come any prejudice when a defendant is merely screened off from a 
child witness, it arguably is less effective when the entire range of pro-
tective measures under the Witness Anonymity Act is used.120 A screen 
used in a case like Coy may signal to the jury that a witness would be 
upset or traumatized by seeing the defendant,121 but the additional 
measures of voice modulation and withholding the witness’s identity 
from the defendant (under the Witness Anonymity Act) makes it more 
likely that the jury will draw the reasonable, yet impermissible, infer-
ence that the defendant remains a danger to the witness.122 Such 
prejudice cannot be cured by a judge’s instruction.123
                                                                                                                      
116 See Howarth, supra note 3, at 7. 
117 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976). 
118 487 U.S. at 1015; see Brief for Appellant at 3, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (No. 
86-6757) (“While placing a criminal defendant in shackles or prison garb during trial nec-
essarily suggests to the jury that he is generally dangerous, use of a screening barrier in 
this case communicated to the jury that appellant was a specific danger to the child witnesses 
. . . .”) (citation omitted). 
119 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1035 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also found sup-
port for his opinion in the trial judge’s “helpful” instruction that the jury “draw no infer-
ences of any kind from the presence of that screen.” Id. 
120 See Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569 (discussing the inherent prejudice that may result 
when a jury draws a “wider range of inferences” from the courtroom practices). 
121 See 487 U.S. at 1020. 
122 See Howarth, supra note 3, at 7. It can further be argued that if witness intimidation 
is as prevalent as supporters of the Witness Anonymity Act contend, then it is even more 
likely that a juror will draw an inference that is prejudicial to the defendant. See, e.g., Jack 
Straw Statement, supra note 24 (noting the increase in witness intimidation in serious 
crimes). 
123 See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 105 advisory committee’s note (explaining the ineffectiveness 
of a limiting instruction when the prejudicial effect to the defendant is too great). 
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C. Can Parliament Make the Unfair Fair?: Corroboration and Forfeiture 
 The interests of justice may be better protected if Parliament con-
siders two approaches that have been accepted abroad and may im-
prove upon the fairness of trials involving anonymous witnesses: cor-
roboration of the anonymous witness’s evidence,124 and “forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.”125 The New Zealand Evidence Act 2006, which served as 
a primary example of anonymous witness legislation for Parliament,126 
requires that a judge consider, inter alia, “whether there is other evi-
dence that corroborates the witness’s evidence.”127 If anonymous testi-
mony, which suffers from the same infirmities as hearsay evidence, was 
corroborated by additional evidence from a non-anonymous source, 
the reliability and credibility of the anonymous witness’s testimony 
would be less problematic.128
 The interests of justice could also be better served if Parliament 
were to consider other methods of protecting witnesses,129 and allow 
anonymous witness testimony only where the defendant has forfeited 
the right to confrontation by attempting to prevent the witness from 
testifying.130 Only briefly touched upon in Davis,131 the consideration of 
“forfeiture by wrongdoing” would be a return to a doctrine rooted in 
English common law.132 The implementation of this rule would no 
doubt raise its own issues,133 but as Lord Carswell noted, that “may re-
quire further argument on some future occasion.”134
                                                                                                                      
 
124 Evidence Act 2006, 2006 S.R. No. 69, § 110(5)(f) (N.Z.). 
125 Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). 
126 Explanatory Notes to the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Bill as Intro-
duced in the House of Commons, July 3, 2008, para. 61. 
127 Evidence Act 2006, § 110(5)(f). 
128 See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 831 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat- 
ever doubt the Court has with the weight to be given the corroborating evidence . . . is no 
justification for rejecting the considered wisdom of virtually the entire legal community that 
corroborating evidence is relevant to reliability and trustworthiness.”); see also Charles R. 
Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational Testing and Corrobora-
tion Under the Confrontation Clause, 81 Va. L. Rev. 149, 170 (1995) (discussing why the major-
ity’s holding in Idaho v. Wright was consistent with Justice Kennedy’s position on corrobora-
tion in the dissent). 
129 Malcolm Swift, Witness Anonymity: A Slippery Slope, Times (London), June 27, 2008, 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article4226732.ece (last visited Apr. 
1, 2009). 
130 See Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2683 (2008). 
131 Davis, 1 A.C. at 1158–59 (Lord Carswell). 
132 See Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2683. 
133 See Davis, 1 A.C. at 1159 (Lord Carswell) (discussing what standard of proof would 
be necessary to establish that the defendant was responsible for intimidating the witness 
(citing R v. Sellick, [2005] EWCA Crim. 651, (2005) 2 Cr. App. R. 15, 231 (U.K))); How-
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Conclusion 
 The decision in Davis has brought the issue of confrontation to the 
forefront of legal debate in the United Kingdom. Parliament has ex-
pressed its clear intent to preserve the use of witness anonymity with 
the passing of the Witness Anonymity Act, which will not expire until 
the end of 2009 (at the earliest). With little or no difference between 
the Witness Anonymity Act and the protective measures held to be un-
fair in Davis, Parliament has simply codified the pre-existing common 
law system for anonymous witnesses. The right to confrontation, born 
in England and preserved in the ECHR, has seemingly lost its protec-
tion. By adopting the U.S. approach to confrontation, the United 
Kingdom can return to basic principles that are essential to a fair trial. 
Until then, defendants will be severely handicapped by a system that 
allows the truth to remain as hidden as the witnesses who bury it. 
                                                                                                                      
arth, supra note 3, at 9 (discussing the difficulty of reconciling “safety” and “fear” with re-
gards to witness intimidation). 
134 Davis, 1 A.C. at 1159. 
